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Military Uses of the Sea to the Year 2000
by
James John Tritten
On October 13, 1775, the Continental Congress authorized the
outfitting of a 10-gun warship to intercept such transports as
might be laden with stores for the enemy, Great Britain. By
December 3, 1775, Lieutenant John Paul Jones broke the American
flag aboard two 24-gun warships, the Alfred and the Columbus.
Despite a history which always enjoyed a navy and a
constitution affirming that Congress must provide and maintain a
navy (but only raise and support armies), this nation tends to
forget that it is essentially an island, with the sea ever
interwoven with the aspirations of its people for freedom,
liberty, and the pursuit of individual dignity.
Our seafaring tradition has long included economic pursuits;
from the Yankee clipper rounding the Horn to the best and
brightest minds from our universities now devising ways to
exploit the ocean's resources. Many Americans are involved with
these economic aspects of the sea, searching for or developing
oil and gas, or building the machines that work on or under the
sea. Vast numbers of Americans are recreational users of the
oceans while virtually all of us enjoy the bountiful gifts of
ocean fisheries.
As economic and recreational users of the oceans, we have
questioned whether our enterprises are efficient, secure, or
equitable; meaning, how well can we make our ideas work, enjoy
the fruits of our labor, and how fair it will be. Few major
activities involving the seas in the future can pass the tests of
efficiency and security. Exploiting gas, oil and minerals in the
ocean depths are examples of activities that may not grow as much
as one might desire due to our inability to ensure that benefits
exceed costs or because we cannot safeguard investments.
Because of these concerns f only a few ocean activities will
continue to receive a great deal of public and private support
through the end of the century. Ports and harbors are included
in this group and we should expect them to be upgraded. Marine
recreation is likely to be supported by the individual citizen
and marine recreation facilities sufficient governmental support
to be managed for the foreseeable future.
Besides these two oceanographic pursuits, it is probably
safe to predict that the world navies will be the single largest
recipient of future ocean resources. Unlike economic pursuits,
navies generally do not have to pass the normal tests of
efficiency before a nation decides to create or maintain one.
Defense of the nation, including the sea, is a prerequisite if
its citizens are to enjoy their hard won rights, freedoms, and
the fruits of a free enterprise system. There will be budget
cuts, of course, but even with across-the-board cuts for defense,
navies will not be allowed to vanish nor even be totally reshaped
using a different mold.
Simply put, this means we in the United States Navy can
fashion a long-range strategic plan that assumes we will need and
have a fleet for the next 50+ years. Very few businesses can
make such basic planning assumptions. Conversely, we can never
start with a clean slate. We will always proceed from the
existing fleet as a baseline when deciding upon the requirements
for our fleet in the future.
Central to maintaining liberty is accepting that with rights
come responsibilities. Preserving our way of life requires
vision, courage, and a commitment to pay whatever price is
necessary. The key question, of course, is how much is enough?
How much should be devoted to defense, to navies, and to the
supporting maritime infrastructure that enables our political
goals to be attained in peace and, if necessary, in war. How
much can we afford to let revised political goals drive
programming given the investment we have already made in today's
fleet and the building program already underway?
Why a Navy?
According to former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, "the
purpose of naval forces is to prevent the seas from becoming a
medium of attack upon the United States, and to ensure that the
United States has unimpeded use of the seas where and when we
must have use of them in war and peace." This mission has broad
bipartisan support in Congress. In this article, I will discuss
the reason why the average American should support a strong
United States Navy.
First, our strategic nuclear naval forces are deployed to
ensure that any adversary would be deterred from launching a
strategic nuclear strike on the United States by the maintenance
of U.S. forces that could launch an unacceptable retaliatory
blow. This deterrent force has recently been enhanced by the
addition of long-range tomahawk cruise missiles and will be
upgraded as the Trident II submarine launched ballistic missile
comes on-line.
As part of this deterrence of nuclear and general war, the
Navy has developed a national maritime strategy emphasizing
forward conventional operations against a highly capable enemy's
most vital resources. The strategy postulates that if
sufficiently strong actions are within our power to take at sea
during the initial, non-nuclear stages of a war, an enemy will
lose the confidence he needs to control escalation and the
outcome of a war; hence he will be deterred from going to war in
the first place.
Strong offensive actions in sea areas vital to the Soviet
Union and, if necessary, against his homeland, will be undertaken
by a combined arms force of carrier battle groups, modern sub-
marines, and land based air power. We are getting smarter in our
operations at sea, and joint actions by all services with our
allies are now the rule rather than the exception. Success in
these operations will help keep the Soviet military near or
inside the Soviet and away from trans-oceanic sea and air lines
of communications.
The current maritime strategy makes good reading if you want
to understand our worldwide obligations and the Navy's contribu-
tions. Perhaps most importantly, this maritime strategy is a
consensus of what experienced and knowledgeable U.S. naval
officers think about operations across the full spectrum of
warfare. The strategy was developed with appropriate consul-
tation with allied navies and is in accordance with our national
military strategy.
Much included in "strategic planning" might sound
adventuristic, but such contingency planning is essential if we
are to be perceived as strong and thus preserve deterrence.
Neither the Navy nor the Department of Defense is planning to
initiate the next war but are instead trying to account for the
full range of possibilities in a very unstable world. If we are
to achieve our national political objectives and at the same time
stay out of the war, then some group of professionals must think
about the very nature of war itself and be clearly seen as being
capable of winning one.
Of course, we are not living in a vacuum. We have to think
not only about war from our own perspective but also from the
perspective of any likely enemy. For example, the Russians,
unlike us, are less impressed with punishment as a means of
deterrence than they are with a nation with the perceived
capability to prevent them from attaining those objectives they
think will be needed in the event of a war. In other words,
quality war-fighting is what the Russians appear to respect most;
such capability will therefore serve deterrence the best.
If a war were to occur, the navies would fight with the
forces they had at the time. The navy that nations choose to
build in peacetime are the tools available to that nation as it
seeks to use military force to achieve political objectives in
war. As Mr. Lehman stated, the navy's role in war also is to
"prevent the seas from becoming a medium of attack upon the
United States." Hence, if we are to take defense of the homeland
seriously, we must act now to attain the capability.
Navies are more than mere instruments of deterrence and of
fighting wars. They are also major instruments of political
statecraft, useful in the projection of power or maintaining an
overseas presence. The U.S. Navy has been the most frequent
military instrument of choice by all administrations, Republican
or Democrat, whenever there was a crisis or the need to use a
military force to make a significant political statement.
Whenever a crisis erupts, one of the first questions asked is
"where is the fleet?"
Our recent operations in the Persian Gulf attest to this.
When there are chinks in the fleet, as with a ready deployed
minesweeping capability, we are asked how that was allowed to
happen, too. Hence, we cannot plan our future fleet merely on
what served us well in the past. Unfortunately, political
scientists are not able to create a perfect crystal ball that
will predict the uses of our fleet tomorrow.
Just as we recognize the political value of navies, so too
does the Soviet Union. From an assessment of their literature,
their capabilities as expressed in the hardware that they buy,
and the manner in which they exercise, it is clear that the
Soviets have read Mahan and Clausewitz and studied their lessons
well. Can we say that we have configured our future fleet to
attain the most likely political goals that will be expected,
given the uncertainties? The dilemma of the inability to predict
political requirements and need to build ships now often results
in building the maximum capability allowable by technology and
then room to grow.
Through a skillful combined use of naval forces, their
merchant marine, and fishing fleets, the Soviet Union is
expanding its presence overseas worldwide. They possess the
largest research, fishing, and passenger fleets in the world.
Their seductive pattern is to approach foreign nations and offer
to pay to fish within the Exclusive Economic Zone; then to
conduct research; and finally to improve the efficiency of those
efforts by leaving the ships deployed overseas and flying relief
crews in and out.
Trade naturally follows, as does an offer to upgrade
airfields and ports. These efforts are more competitive than
ours because the Soviet state provides the hardware and sets
salaries at unrealistically low rates. The Soviet merchant
marine can set its prices below fair market rates to enter that
market and capture a part of it. This is an unfortunate
asymmetry and one that is difficult to counter given our free
enterprise economic system.
The Soviet merchant marine has grown from just over 400
ships after World War II to some 2500 today. We are all aware of
the deterioration of the U.S. flag fleet, from a high of around
4500 ships in 1945 to around 600 ships today, less than one-
fourth the number in the Soviet fleet. Even with the assistance
of allies, we must do more to redress the imbalance. How, is the
obvious question - with the equally obvious answer of, devoting
more resources. Competing needs for scarce resources, however,
often relegates lower order contingencies below the funded
program lines. The Soviets on the other hands, seem to under-
stand the real lesson of Mahan - that sea power is more than just
naval power.
The Russians are respected for their innovative designs for
maritime vessels and successfully adapting foreign technologies
to a wide variety of oceanographic purposes. Soviet shipbuilders
have already demonstrated that they can produce the world's
deepest diving and fastest submarines. They have no difficulty
experimenting with new ship designs and often build new ships
that would never leave the drawing boards in the U.S. We will
probably be unable to completely stop the flow of critical
technology that helps the Soviets build better sea power; we will
likely only be able to delay that transfer and raise its price.
Traditionally, the U.S. Navy has not been used to enforce
domestic laws but we are beginning to see an expanded role in
this area. With the new Law of the Sea Treaty and President
Reagan's declaration of an Exclusive Economic Zone, the navy will
find itself more in the role of enforcement than ever before.
Even the most successful nation cannot afford the ships required
to maintain a presence in these new ocean areas, and we will have
to negotiate with the Coast Guard over roles and missions in an
era of dwindling budgets. Smaller nations cannot afford both a
revenue service and some navies combine these functions. This is
an opportunity for those in the aircraft and shipbuilding
industries to provide hardware to emerging navies of smaller
nations
.
Navies are used by all nations to express an interest in
certain key areas. Our sailors, airmen, and marines, men and
women alike, are on duty throughout the seven seas, signalling
the commitment of America to its national security and its allies
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throughout the world. These servicemen and women are a vital
reminder of American power committed to help our friends maintain
their independence and freedom.
Navies , of course, are also symbols of great power status;
only the wealthiest can afford the modern navy and its
multipurpose carrier battle groups. Only the wealthiest can
afford those vehicles that can dive to the bottom of the Marianas
Trench. Only the most advanced nations can afford a navy that
can, in the face of opposition, project power ashore in some
distant foreign land. Can we afford not to have such a first-
rate Navy?
Navies are Unique
In thinking about navies, we must also reckon with some of
the more unique properties of naval warfare and military
operations on the high seas. We might debate the degree of
uniqueness; are these properties sufficiently different to
matter? I think they are and would like to give you some
examples
:
First, navies and those who work on or under the oceans,
operate in a unique environment, in the form of geographic and
weather phenomena. It is far easier to support and sustain life
on land than it is to do on, or under, the sea.
Second, due to the size and opacity of the oceans, nations
can hide their forces at sea. I am amused by some civilian
"experts" who write that due to advances in antisubmarine warfare
our nuclear ballistic missile submarines are at risk.
Fortunately search, detection, classification, localization,
tracking, and attack techniques have not progressed to the state
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where the navy is incapable of carrying out its deterrence
missions.
Third, a major war at sea is automatically a global war. If
the two superpowers were to ever fight in a general war, say in
Europe, it is inconceivable that the navies of those powers would
render honors when passing each other anywhere else on the globe,
for example, in the Pacific.
Fourth, war at sea has no FEBAs, or FLOTs, terms used by
armies to describe the dividing lines between combatants. At
sea, the enemy can and does strike from every point of the
compass, from land, from the air, from the surface of the oceans,
and from beneath the seas. We now have to comprehend the
military uses of space when we consider war at sea. Indeed, why
should we even assume that the next war would start on planet
Earth?
Fifth, while land warfare is fought to possess territory,
war at sea is over communications; the sea lines of
communication. The purpose of naval operations at sea today is
the same as in the days of Roman galleys or Spanish galleons; so
that nations can use the sea whenever and wherever they desire.
Implicit in this argument is the realization that navies also
exist to deny an enemy his unfettered use of the sea- Our Navy
must be able to frustrate an enemy Navy's ability to strike the
United States in the event of a war.
The sea is a no man's land owned by no one. Navies have a
unique right to transit over, on, and under the ocean from our
own shores to the territorial seas of any other nation. Navies
also have the right of innocent passage through another nation's
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territorial seas; a legal right not shared by land armies.
Once out of sight of land, the captain of a ship is in a
special position of both responsibility and authority.
Throughout history, the men who have been attracted to sea
services have tended to be independent and able to improvise
given broad directions. In our age of instant long-distance
communications, our naval commanders will undoubtedly receive
more direction from shore-based headquarters. This ability might
also raise the level of consciousness of our national leaders and
the public as to the value of and necessity for a navy. These
new communication techniques are thus both a blessing and a
drawback.
Conclusion
There is a strong interrelationship between navies and
international politics. Navies are about war and the threat and
the actual use of forces as an instrument of statecraft; and war
and the threat of force is about politics. Having the capability
to fight a war, we hope we will never have to. Being able to
fight a war and the deterrence of war is what the citizens of
this nation hire its navy to do.
Our citizens should not be alarmed about talk of the use of
force to achieve political goals but, rather, should be comforted
that its government takes its responsibilities very seriously and
is constantly working to ensure that the nation is_ secure , can
enjoy its freedoms, and maintain its way of life. Navies are but
one very important tool that governments can use to achieve these
goals.
Navies are not the end all, which is probably the last
11
unique property that I should impart. The U.S. Navy cannot "win"
a future war against a major continental power; it will take
combined arms to do that. It will take a man in-uniform with a
gun-to occupy, and administer territory, and settle post-war
boundaries
.
The closest that navies came to winning a recent major war
was in the Pacific against Japan. But even there, Admiral
Nimitz agreed, strategic bombing played a significant role in the
decision to terminate the war prior to an actual invasion of the
islands. As the remainder of this century unfolds, we will see a
more integrated approach to warfare, a joint or combined arms
approach that capitalizes upon the attributes of all our military
services.
It not robust enough to survive the initial stages of a
future war, and if not capable of "sailing into harms way,"
however, the U.S. Navy could lose that war. This was the
situation facing the British Grand Fleet in WWI. Admiral Sir
John Jellico could not win WWI for the allies but if he allowed
the German High Seas Fleet to break the blockade and threaten the
allied sea lines of communication, he might cause its loss. The
risk of failure, however was great enough to cause the British to
wait in Scapa Flow instead of sailing into the Baltic. The
German's, on the other hand, had to risk sending their fleet into
the North Sea, since they knew they could not win without
defeating allied sea power. Admiral Reinhard Scheer's failure to
achieve his strategic goal of breaking the blockade and
disrupting the sea lines of communication contributed
significantly to the Kaiser's eventual downfall.
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Unless this country is prepared to fight future wars on U.S.
soil, it must transport its men and materials overseas so that
those wars would be fought on someone else's territory. Those
men and material cross the oceans and need to be protected by a
navy. The national maritime strategy is designed to do those
tasks if we are ever to fight a war in the future. We hope the
perceived ability to successfully execute the maritime strategy
will convince an enemy that he cannot control the war or achieve
his own war aims; thus giving him cause to not go to war or to
terminate before a war escalates vertically or turns into a long
war of attrition that he knows he cannot win.
The U.S. is an island nation; dependent upon the unfettered
use of the high seas for maintenance of our present style of
life. If we are to continue to exercise the influence throughout
the world that we apparently desire to, it will be up to the Navy
to explain how it can apply military force to achieve political
goals in time of war or peace.
The challenges facing the national leadership throughout
this century are to achieve our political objectives at the
lowest possible cost. In doing so, the senior leadership of the
Navy must help the other services, joint and OSD organizations,
the White House, the Congress, and above all, the American public
to recognize the unique properties of operations at sea and what
navies can do, and will continue to do, for this nation. If we
in the Navy fail to meet the challenge, there are others who will
gladly accept the responsibilities of leadership and the
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